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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BLAINE GATES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7421 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT O·F FACTS 
This is an ap.peal from a judgment of the Third 
District Court wherein defendant was pronounced guilty 
of the crime of carnal knowledge. The appeal is based 
primarily upon the judgment roll. 
The statement of facts contained in appellant's brief 
is substantially correct. Though we do not regard this 
discrepancy as controlling the questions involved, re-
spondent points out that the only ap·parent amendment 
by interlineation on the face of the com'plaint is one 
changing the word "8th" to "16th." From al2. indica-
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tions in the judgment roll, the phrase "or about" was· 
typed into -the complaint before it became a part of the 
record. Where there is an interlineation in an indictment 
or complaint, it must be presumed, in the absence of a 
contrary showing, that the change was made before 
indorsement by the grand jury foreman or verification 
by the complainant. French v. St.ate, 12 Ind. 670, 74 
Am. Dec. 229; Cook v. St~ate, 119 Ga. 108, 46 S. E. 64. 
Except for the extent of the amendment of the complaint, 
respondent agrees with appellant's statement of facts. 
STATEMENT OF POIN'T·S 
For the affirmance of the judgment below, respon-
dent will rely upon the following propositions: 
1. Reverification of a complaint is not necessary 
because the date of the offense has been amended unless 
the date is of the essence of the offense. 
2. _ A plea of "not guilty" to an information, with-
out defendant having moved to quash, operates as a 
waiver of antecedent defects. 
ARG·UMENT 
I. 
REVERIFICATION OF A COMPLAINT IS NOT NECES-
SARY BECAUSE THE DATE OF THE OFFENSE 'HAS BEEN 
AMEN·DED UNLESS THE DATE IS OF THE ESSENCE OF 
THE OFFENSE. 
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· Defendant's argument, as we understand it, is this: 
'':here a ·prosecution for a crin1e is founded upon an 
inforn1ation, rather than an indictn1ent, the accusation 
must be laid in the first instance by a verified complaint. 
,,~ithout a verified con1plaint the committing magistrate 
is "ithout jurisdiction to act; and when a material amend-
ment is made to a complaint that document must be 
reverified. Here there was a material amendment but 
no reverifiea tion, therefore the magistrate lost juris-
dirtion to proceed. Inasmuch as the magistrate had lost 
jurisdiction, defendant was n·ever granted a preliminary 
hearing on the crime of which he stood accused. But 
defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing in every 
instance unless the hearing is waived. There was no 
'vaiver, therefore the conviction on the information 
should be reversed. 
The argument has some validity, but under the 
facts here it is based upon two assumptions that are 
unwarranted. The first assumption is that a variance in 
the date of the offense is material to the crime charged. 
It is well established that an indictment, informa-
tion or eomplaint may he amended by a court as to 
matters of form only, 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 314. 
It is also the general r~le that an allegation as to the 
time or date is usually regarded as a matter of form, 
unless the act must have been committed at a particular 
tiine in order to constitute the offense charged. 7 A.L.R. 
1516, 68 A.L.R. 928. This court has often held that such 
an amendment may he made to an information although 
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the original information was drawn according to the 
charge in the complaint. St~ate v. Sheffield, 45 Utah 426, 
146 Pac. 306; State v. D·istefano, 70 Utah 586, 262 Pac. 
113, 116; St.ate v. C~ooper, (Utah) 201 P. 2d 764. 
The rule is statutory in Utah. In 105-21-12 Utah 
.Code Annotated 1943, it is provided: 
"(1) An information or indictment need 
contain no allegation of the time of the commis-
sion of the offense unless such allegation is neces-
sary to charge the offense under section 105-21-8. 
(2) The allegation in an information or in-
dictment that the defendant committed the. offense 
shall in all cases be considered an allegation that 
the offense was committed after it became an 
offense and before finding of the information or 
indictment, and within the period of limitations 
prescribed by law for the prosecution of the 
offense." 
The provisions for amendment of informations and 
indictments are contained in 105-21-43. In 105-21-42 it 
is p·rovided that any unnecessary allegation shall be con-
sidered surplusage. 
This court held in St.ate v. Cox, 106 Utah 253, 147 P. 
2d 858, that the time need not be alleged in the informa-
tion and, if alleged, need not be p-roved as alleged, but 
may he proved to have heen committed at any time 
.during the period of limitations and before the date of 
the information. 
'The above cases indicate that the rules governing 
amendments to informations are very liberal-of such 
a nature that they gua.rantee the efficia.cy of criminal p~o-
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cedure and at the same tin1e protect the rights of accused 
persons. That the same liberal rules should apply to 
complaints is demanded both by logic and by statute~· 
By amending the charge during the preliminary ex-
amination, the defendant is notified very early in the 
proceedings of the date which the state intends to prove. 
The possibility of prejudice resulting from surprise a.t 
this stage is virtually non-existent. What the state can 
accomrp~lish later in the proceedings it can, a fortiori, in 
most instances do earlier. 
If there was, prior to 1935, some doubt about the 
right to amend the complaint it should have been dis-
pelled by the amendment that year to 105-11-1 Utah 
Code Annotated 1943. That section sets out the neces-
sary contents of a complaint (the date is not mentioned) 
and then provides : 
"However, in cases of public offenses triable 
on information, indictment or accusation, the 
complaint,. the right to a bill of particulars, and 
all proceedings and matters in relation thereto, 
shall conform to and be governed by the pro-
visions of the new Chapters 21 and 23, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, as enacted by Chapter 
118, Laws of Utah, 1935." 
It is argued that by changing the date the state 
changed the nature of the offense. A similar argument 
was presented to the court in St,ate v. Sheffield, 45 Utah 
426, 146 Pac. 306, decided before the amendment to 105-
11-1. There the court upheld an amendment of the infor-
mation as to date even though the new date was for a 
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different act than the one originally. The decision was 
based on the ground that the same offense wa~ charged 
and that inasmuch as the complaint could have been 
amended, so could the information. Said the court: 
''Time being immaterial, the adulterous act 
of the 16th was as much charged in the complaint 
and in the inforn1ation as the one on the 23rd. 
To hold otherwise is to hold that the State was 
bound by the date laid in the complaint and in 
the information. As to this, the case of State v. 
Hilberg, 22 Utah 27; 61 Pac. 215, is in point. 
* * * * 
What here is the charged offense~ Adultery, 
committed by the defendant with W. v,:ithin the 
venue and jurisdiction of the court~ What are the 
essentials of that offense~ That the defendant, a 
married man, within that venue and jurisdiction 
carnally knew W., · a woman not his wife. It is 
of little moment when that sexual intimacy, that 
criminal act, was committed so long as it is 
alleged and proved to have been committed prior 
to the filing of the information and within the 
period of limitation. :J: * * 
There can be no doubt that, under the com-
plaint charging the criminal act or offense on the 
23rd, the magistrate could have investigated one 
claimed to have been committed on the 16th. The 
one being charged as well as the other, evidence 
before the magistrate. to establish the charged 
offense was as !J'ermissible to show the one as the 
other. Sinee the information may be as broad as 
the complaint and for any criminal act or offense 
charged or embraced within it and which under 
it properly could have heen investigated by the 
magistrate, it necessarily followed that what was 
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alleged in the complaint and 'vhich conld have 
been proved under it as the act or offense charged 
may also be alleged in the information and p-roved 
under it * * *." 
While State v. Sheffield was questioned by the 
majority opinion in St·ate v. Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 17.6 
Pac. 860, it was questioned only to the extent of its appli-
cation to a situation where different dates churged are 
for different ac.ts. And Justice Frick's concurring opinion 
in the Nelson case is enlightening. 
In the present case there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the act committed on the 16th was a dif-
ferent act from the one originally charged on the 8th. 
And even if we conclude that an amendment may not 
be made so as to charge a -different act constituting the 
same offense, still the defendant must show, by the 
reco.rd, that two different acts are charged. The defen-
dant has failed in this regard. A reversal may not be 
had on conjecture alone; the defendant must show that 
he has been prejudiced. In the bill of exceptions there 
is some testimony of other offenses committed by the 
defendan:t against the prosecutrix, but there is no 
evidence of any other specific act. -
There can be no serious contention that there was 
a possibility of placing the defendant in double jeopardy. 
The crime of which he was convicted is sufficiently de-
fined to identify the offense without disp·ute. The hold-
ing of a rplreliminary examination does not place a de-
fendant in jeopardy. St,ate v. Dean, 69 Utah 268, 276, 
254 Pac. 142. 
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II. 
A PLEA OF "NOT GUILTY" TO AN INFORMATION, 
WITHOUT DEFENDANT HAVING MOVED TO QUASH, 
OPERATES AS A WAIVER OF ANTECEDENT DEFECTS. 
At eommon law convictions were often set aside for 
some technical defect in the proceedings prior to trial. 
A.s the penalties for conviction became less severe there 
was no longer a need for the technical requirements in 
procedure that had theretofore existed. The courts them-
selves saw this and to a certain extent ameliorated the 
rules that had prevailed. The legislatures, too, saw a 
need for a type of procedure which would protect accused 
persons and yet at the same time enable the state to 
procure convictions where the facts demanded it. To 
this end rules of pleading and trial were liberalized so 
as to prevent the guilty from relying upon technical ob-
jections to overcome what otherwise would be substantial 
justice. The preliminary examination, often conducted 
by magistrates without legal training, and hence often 
open to technical objections, was o~e of the objectives 
of the curative effects of 105-16-2 Utah Code Annotated 
1943: 
"No defect or irregularity in or want or 
absence of any proceeding or statutory require-
ment, prior to the filing of an information or 
indictment, including the ~preliminary nearing, 
shall constitute prejudicial error and the defen-
dant shall be conclusively presumed to have 
waived any such defect, irregularity, want or 
absence of proceeding or statutory requirement, 
unless he shall before pleading to the informa-
tion or indictment specifically and expressly 
10 
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object to the information or indictn1ent on that 
ground. VVhenever the consent of the state to 
such 'vaiver by the defendant is required, such 
consent shall be conclusively presumed unless the 
state before or at the time the defendant pleads 
to the information or indictment expressly ob-
jects to such waiver." 
This should be read ·with 105-23-10: 
''If the defendant does not move to quash 
the information or indictment before or at the 
time he pleads thereto he shall be taken to have 
waived all objections which are grounds for 
motion to quash except those which are also 
grounds for a motion in arrest of judgment.'' 
Under the provisions of 105-23-3 (2) (a) one of the 
grounds for a motion to quash an information is that 
it was filed ''without the defendant first having had or 
waived preliminary examination.'' Thus we see that 
defendant would be barred by the provisions of two 
separate sections of the code from objecting, at this 
stage of the proceedings, to the amendment of the com-
plaint by the magistrate. See State v. Freeman, 93 Utah 
125, 135, 71 P. 2d 196; St.ate v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 
142 P. 2d 178; Rogerson v. H~arris, 111 Utah 330, 178 
P. 2d 397; State v. Leek, 85 Utah 531, 535, 39 P. 2d 
1091. 
In the instant case the defendant proceeded through 
the preliminary examination, P'leaded to the informa-
tion, made no objections to the introduction of evidence 
of the offense of the 16th, made no motion for a ne"r 
trial or in arrest of judgment-and then ·appealed 
1 1 
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claiming he had not been granted a preliminary hearing 
on the offense charged. To reverse a conviction in such 
a case would be to abrogate well-defined principles of 
p·roced ure. 
CONCLUSION 
The date not being material to the charging of an 
offense under our Code of Criminal Procedure, an infor-
mation may be amended as to the date at any time, 
so long as the defendant is not prejudiced by the amend-
ment. The rules applicable to amendment of informa-
tions are to be applied also to complaints. 
Furthermore, even if we were to regard the amend-
ment as one of substance rather than form, the failure 
of the magistrate to require the complainant to reverify 
the complaint was subject to attack by way of a motion 
to quash the information, and, defendant having failed 
to make any such motion, the objection to the defect 
was waived. 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment and sen-
tence of the court below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C·LINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
BRYCE E. ROE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff ·and Respondent 
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